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AGENCY - DUTY TO EMPLOYER - UNFAIR COMPETITION 
- EMPLOYEE DOES NOT BREACH FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
EMPLOYER BY MERE FAILURE TO DISCLOSE DETAILS' OF 
PREPARATORY PLANS OF FUTURE COMPETITION. MARY-
LAND METALS, INC. u. METZNER, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 
(1978). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent case of Maryland Metals, Inc. u. Metzner,! which 
involved an employee's privilege to plan and prepare for competition 
with his employer before terminating his employment, signals a 
shift in the Maryland court's focus when confronted with employer-
employee disputes. The precise question addressed by the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland was whether two employees breached their 
common law fiduciary duties2 to their employer by not revealing 
details of their preparatory activities in establishing a competitive 
business.3 In a unanimous opinion written by the late Judge Irving 
Levine, the court held that the employees' failure to disclose details 
of preliminary arrangements for future competition prior to 
terminating their employment did not constitute a breach of 
fiduciary duty because there was no wrongful conduct independent 
of the nondisclosure that detrimentally affected the employer's 
business.4 
Frequently, an employee who desires to leave his employment 
confronts the dilemma of choosing between his need to commence 
plans for a change of employment prior to leaving his employer and 
his possible breach of the duty of loyalty owed to his employer. 
Although the law in Maryland has recognized an employee's 
privilege to plan and prepare for future competition with his 
employer prior to terminating his employment,5 the courts have not 
1. 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978). 
2. The fiduciary duties of an employee, as well as an agent, may arise from either of 
two sources: a written contract or common law. An elaborate discussion of an 
employee's common law duties to his employer is found in Trice v. Comstock, 121 
F. 620 (8th Cir. 1903). The employees in Maryland Metals did not have a written 
employment contract, therefore, the corporation alleged a breach of common law 
fiduciary duties. 
3. The employees preparatory activities were extensive. Brief for Appellant at 7-15, 
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31,382 A.2d 564 (1978) (seventy-one 
surreptitious events attributed to the employees while employed by Maryland 
Metals). 
4. 282 Md. at 48, 382 A.2d at 573. The employees in this case were high-level 
managerial officers of Maryland Metals, Inc. Since the court declared that they 
had no obligation to disclose details of their preparatory activities, a fortiori 
lower-level employees would not be required to disclose similar activities. 
5. Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 572, 217 A.2d 
375, 388 (1966); C-E-I-R, Inc., v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 366, 183 
A.2d 374, 379 (1962); Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 
604-06, 119 A.2d 392, 398 (1956). Accord, United Aircraft Corp. v. Boreen, 413 
F.2d 694, 700 (3d Cir. 1969); Keiser v. Walsh, 118 F.2d 13, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1941); 
Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 346, 411 P.2d 921, 935, 49 Cal. Rptr. 
825, 839 (1966). 
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been successful in resolving this dilemma due to their imprecision in 
defining the scope of the employee's privilege.6 Maryland Metals 
provides some assistance by delineating permissible and 
impermissible employee conduct in preparing to compete with an 
employer prior to terminating employment. 
II. THE MARYLAND METALS SETTING 
The Maryland Metals controversy developed as a result of rapid 
technological advances in the design and manufacture of machinery 
in the scrap metal business.7 In 1966, Maryland Metals, Inc., a 
processor of scrap metal, purchased a guillotine shears in order to 
scrap junked automobiles. During the next seven years, the 
corporation directed Sidney Metzner, the executive vice president,9 to 
tour the country and evaluate a newer and more sophisticated 
machine known as a shredder. 10 Metzner fully apprised the 
corporation of the shredder's superior capabilities and continually 
recommended its acquisition. 
In September of 1970, Harry Kerstein, president of Maryland 
Metals, II was authorized by the board of directors to purchase a 
shredder from a leading manufacturer.l 2 Subsequently, Maryland 
Metals entered into a cancelable contract with the manufacturer and 
procured an option to buy land suitable for a shredding operation. 
6. See, e.g., C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 
(1962). Judge Sybert, in C-E-I-R, indicated that "[t]here would appear to be no 
precise line between acts by an employee which constitute mere preparation and 
those which amount to solicitation. However indefinite that line may be, we feel 
that the appellees crossed over the line into the area of solicitation forbidden to 
the loyal employee." ld. at 367, 183 A.2d at 379. See generally Comment, 
Permissible Employee Disloyalty and the Duane Jones Case, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 
278 (1954). See also Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 629 (D. Del. 
1943), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945) (court acknowledged that 
"[t]he doctrine of the fiduciary relation is one of the most confused and entangled 
subjects in corporation law"). 
7. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 34, 382 A.2d 564, 566 (1978) (court 
indicated that these developments "contributed significantly to the genesis" of 
the case). 
8. The guillotine shear was purchased for $400,000.00. The shear produced a No.2 
grade scrap metal by shearing automobile hulks into slabs containing metal and 
non-metal objects. ld. at 34 n.1, 382 A.2d at 566 n.1. 
9. Metzner was appointed executive vice-president after twenty-three years of 
service. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 34, 382 A.2d 564, 566 
(1978). 
10. A shredder produces a No.1, or premium, grade of scrap metal. Its output isa 
purified scrap product because the machine is capable of segregating non-steel 
from steel and non-metal from metal. ld. at 34 n.2, 382 A.2d at 566 n.2. 
Furthermore, a shredder produces twice as much scrap tonnage per day as the 
guillotine shear. Brief for Appellant at 5, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 
Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978). 
11. Harry Kerstein founded the business and upon incorporation in 1955 became the 
first president of the company and sole stockholder. ld. at 33, 382 A.2d at 566. 
12. ld. at 35, 382 A.2d at 566. 
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Because of unforeseen economic conditions and growing skepticism 
concerning the efficiency of the shredder, the contract was rescinded 
and the option was not exercised. I3 
Harry Kerstein died in June 1973 and his son, Robert Kerstein, 
succeeded him as president of Maryland Metals. Metzner, assisted 
by a fellow executive, George Sellers,14 was told again to investigate 
the economic feasibility of acquiring a shredder. Based on their 
comprehensive study, Metzner and Sellers recommended to Kerstein 
that Maryland Metals expand its business operations by purchasing 
a shredder. When the corporation failed to take action, both 
employees indicated an unwillingness to remain in the company's 
employment as salaried employees. I5 
In November 1973, Metzner met with Kerstein and demanded 
that he be allowed to own equity in the corporation. After Kerstein 
denied the request,I6 Metzner suggested that he, Sellers and Kerstein 
form a new corporation with each individual owning a one-third 
interest in the shredding operation. I7 Kerstein rejected the plan and 
Metzner informed Kerstein that he and Sellers would purchase a 
shredder and operate a business without his participation. 18 
13. Id. at 35, 382 A.2d at 567. 
14. Sellers was employed upon Metzner's recommendation in 1970. By 1974, Sellers 
was vice-president in charge of operations. Id. at 34, 382 A.2d at 566. 
15. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Conservit, Inc., No. 29, 472 Equity, slip op. at 3-4 
(Wash. Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1976), aff'd, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978); Brieffor 
Appellees at 23, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 
(1978). 
16. When Harry Kerstein died, he left all the Maryland Metals stock in a 
testamentary trust. 282 Md. at 36, 382 A.2d at 567. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE 
ANN. § 4-412 (1974) (legacy to testamentary trust). Since the stock was tied up in 
the trust, Robert Kerstein was unable to distribute any of it. 
17. 282 Md. at 36, 382 A.2d at 567. 
18. Id. There was conflicting testimony as to whether Metzner informed Kerstein 
that he and Sellers would set up an operation to compete with Maryland Metals. 
The Chancellor, Judge Rutledge, sitting in the Circuit Court for Washington 
County without a jury, found that the employees had notified Kerstein that if he 
or Maryland Metals was not willing to participate in the proposed shredding 
operation, they would enter into business for themselves with or without 
Kerstein.ld. at 41,382 A.2d at 570. Maryland Metals, however, denied receiving 
such notification. Id. at 42 n.4, 382 A.2d at 570 n.4. The court of appeals 
considered the evidence in a light most favorable to Metzner and Sellers, and 
declined to disturb the Chancellor's findings because they were not clearly 
erroneous under Md. Rule 886 (1978) (appellate review by court of appeals of 
action tried by lower court without jury). Id. at 41, 382 A.2d at 570. 
A major factor in the lower court's decision was the credibility of the 
employees, whose fidelity, loyalty and honesty were in question. The Chancellor, 
however, did not have the opportunity of observing and hearing an examination 
of Sellers at trial because large portions of his deposition were read into evidence, 
despite the fact that Sellers was present in the courtroom. Brief for Appellant at 
44, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978). An 
important procedural ruling made by the Court of Appeals of Maryland was that 
Md. Rule 413(a)(4) (1978) allows the trial judge broad discretion in deciding when 
and for what purpose a deposition may be read into evidence after a portion of 
the deposition has been introduced by an adverse party. 282 Md. at 49, 382 A.2d 
at 574. 
362 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 8 
Thereafter, Metzner and Sellers commenced a series of activities that 
led to the establishment of an independent shredding operation.19 
The new operation opened for business in March of 1975, nine 
months after Metzner and Sellers had terminated their employment 
with Maryland Metals.20 From the time the employees first disclosed 
their general plans to form an independent business until 
termination of their employment, they continued to work long hours 
and devote considerable efforts on behalf of Maryland Metals.21 
Shortly after Metzner and Sellers's new shredding business 
opened, Maryland Metals sought to enjoin the operation of the rival 
scrap metal business and claimed damages against Metzner and 
Sellers for breach of fiduciary duties. 22 The trial court denied relief, 
ruling that the employees' preparatory activities did not constitute 
wrongful behavior.23 Maryland Metals appealed and the court of 
appeals granted certiorari.24 
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S 
HOLDING 
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling that 
Maryland law does not require an employee to disclose in detail his 
preparatory activities to enter into competition with his employer 
unless some other act, beyond mere nondisclosure, is inimical to the 
employer's business. 
19. A chronological summary of the employees' activities is as follows: 
December 1973 - Employees formed Delaware corporation, which 
qualified to do business in Maryland, and contacted the electric company 
regarding power requirements for the shredding operation. 
January 1974 - Employees applied for loan to purchase shredder. 
This loan was consummated in August 1974. 
February 1974 - Employees obtained an option on land and 
executed a sales agreement for the shredder. 
May 1974 - Sellers was discharged by Maryland Metals and 
Metzner resigned, but continued working until June 1974. 
July 1974 - Employees formed new Maryland corporation for the 
shredder business. 
March 1975 - Competitive shredder business opened. 
ld. at 42-43. 382 A.2d at 570-71. 
20. There is no doubt that if the employees had opened their competitive business 
before they terminated their employment with Maryland Metals, they would 
have been found in breach of their fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Ritterpusch v. 
Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 602 A.2d 392, 397 (1956). See also 
Aero Drapery of Ky., Inc. v. Engdahl. 507 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1974). 
21. The fiscal year ending in 1974, the last year Metzner and Sellers worked for 
Maryland Metals, was the best year in the corporation's history. Brief for 
Appellees at 9-10, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 
(1978). 
22. 282 Md. at 33, 382 A.2d at 566. 
23.ld. 
24. ld. The court of appeals granted certiorari in advance of oral arguments in the 
court of special appeals pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-203 
(1974). 
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The court was mindful of two important public policies in this 
area of the law.25 On the one hand, courts have required undivided 
employee loyalty in order to protect an employer's proprietary 
interest in his business from unfair competition.26 There is also an 
equally strong policy that favors "free and vigorous competition in 
the economic sphere."27 An important aspect of vigorous competition 
is the legal right of an individual to choose his own employment.28 
Since every person has a right to improve his own socio-economic 
status, his "spirit of enterprise [should not be] unduly hampered."29 
Employees are not precluded, by virtue of their employment 
relationship, from exercising their legal right to enter into 
competition against a former employer provided the employee's 
25. The court indicated that in balancing an employee's right to enter into 
competition with his employer against the countervailing right of an employer to 
restrain his agent's competitive endeavors, the law seeks to harmonize two 
important policies. The first is that "commercial competition must be conducted 
according to basic rules of honesty and fair dealing .... The second policy 
recognized by the courts is that of safeguarding society's interest in fostering free 
and vigorous competition in the economic sphere." 282 Md. at 37-38,382 A.2d at 
568. 
26. ld. See Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 575, 
217 A.2d 375, 389 (1966); Comment, The Obligation of a High-Level Employee to 
His Former Employer: The Standard Brands Case, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 351 
(1962). 
27. 282 Md. at 37-38, 382 A.2d at 568. 
28. Id. at 39, 382 A.2d at 569; Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Turner, 30 N.C. App. 
686,691-92,228 S.E.2d 478, 483 (1976); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 578,160 
A.2d 430, 434 (1960). 
The Supreme Court has not decided whether an individual has a constitu-
tional right to work. Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (when faced 
with a constitutional challenge of a state statute that excluded Medicaid 
payments for certain abortions by two licensed physicians, Court declined to 
decide whether' the doctors had a constitutional right to practice medicine). In 
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), however, Justice Stevens quoted 
with approval the language of Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915): "It requires no 
argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations 
of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity 
that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure .... " 426 U.S. 
at 102-03 n.23. See also Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting): 
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that 
man possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live, 
to be free, to own property. The American ideal was stated by Emerson 
in his essay on Politics, "A man has a right to be employed, to be trusted, 
to be loved, to be revered." It does many men little good to stay alive and 
free and propertied, if they cannot work. To work means to eat. It also 
means to live. For many it would be better to work in jail, than to sit idle 
on the curb. The great values of freedom are in the opportunities afforded 
man to press to new horizons, to pit his strength against the forces of 
nature, to match skills with his fellow man. 
Id. at 472. 
29. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39, 38lfA.2cC564, 568-69 (1978) 
(quoting Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 575, 
217 A.2d 375, 389 (1966». 
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conduct does not constitute an unfair competitive practice.30 
Furthermore, the right of an employee to economic advancement 
includes a legal privilege to plan and prepare to compete with an 
employer prior to terminating employment.31 The law has recognized 
that an employee "need not wait until he is on the street before he 
looks for other work. He may plan and prepare, during the agency, to 
engage in a business after it ceases."32 
In Maryland Metals, the court used a balancing test to reconcile 
and harmonize the two competing policies. The court began its 
reasoning by acknowledging that an employee owes a duty of 
loyalty and fidelity to his employer,33 balanced with the legal 
privilege of an employee to plan and prepare to compete with his 
employer prior to ending his employment.34 It noted, however, that 
the privilege is not absolute and can be extinguished by serious 
misconduct.35 The court reasoned that to require an employee to 
disclose the precise nature of competitive plans to his employer 
before terminating his employment would have a chilling effect upon 
the employee's right to compete and thereby stifle free enterprise.36 
Thus, the court declared, if the privilege is to have any effect, it must 
be capable of exercise without the necessity of revealing the details 
of preparatory plans to the employer.37 An employee's liability for 
breach of fiduciary duty is not predicated on mere failure to disclose 
30. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978). See 
Group Ass'n Plans, Inc. v. Colquhoun, 466 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The "duty to 
a former employer, and the doctrine of freedom to compete absent contractual 
duties to the contrary, are not mutually inconsistent." Id. at 474. 
31. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 39, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978); 
Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 572, 217 A.2d 
375, 388 (1966); C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 366, 183 
A.2d 374, 379 (1962); Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 
602, 119 A.2d 392, 396-97 (1956). 
32. Keiser v. Walsh, 118 F.2d 13, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See Meyers v. Roger J. Sullivan 
Co., 166 Mich. 193, 131 N.W. 521 (1911). "A servant may not, while engaged in 
the service of his master, 'injure his trade, or undermine his business; but every 
one has a right if he can to better his situation in the world, and if he does it by 
means not contrary to law, though the master may be eventually injured, it is 
damnum absque injuria.'" Id. at 195, 131 N.W. at 523. 
33. E.g., De Crette v. Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 115, 127 A. 639, 642 (1925); Cumberland 
Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 581, 605 (1875); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 
458, 464-65, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). Public policy demands that corporate 
officers and directors scrupulously observe their fiduciary duties of diligence, 
obedience, fidelity and honesty. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 235 (2d 
ed. 1970). The standard of care required of directors is statutorily set forth under 
Maryland law. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.1 (1976). See also Miller, 
The Fiduciary Duties of a Corporate Director, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 259 (1975). 
34. 282 Md. 31, 39, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978). 
35. Id. at 40, 382 A.2d at 569. 
36. Id. at 47-48, 382 A.2d at 573. 
37. Id. Accord, National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 26-27 (Mo. 1966); 
see Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 413 (3d Cir. 1961). 
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such preparatory acts, but rather upon some particular circumstance 
that renders nondisclosure injurious to the employer's business.3s 
The leading Maryland case illustrating unreasonable conduct 
and unfair competition is C-E-I-R, Inc. u. Computer Dynamics 
Corp.39 In that case, C-E-I-R sought injunctive relief and monetary 
damages against former loyal employees and a competing business 
formed by them. The evidence revealed that the employees engaged 
in unfair competition and breached their fiduciary duties by 
soliciting the employer's customers, luring key personnel to the new 
competitor, diverting corporate opportunities to themselves, and 
acquiring information of a unique nature in violation of their written 
agreements.40 Under these circumstances, the court of appeals held 
that the employees breached their fiduciary duties because the 
activities were detrimental to the employer's business. 41 
Relying on C-E-I-R, the main contention of Maryland Metals 
was that the failure of its high-echelon employees to disclose their 
numerous surreptitious acts42 constituted a breach of their fiduciary 
38. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 42 n.4, 382 A.2d 564, 570 n.4 (1978); 
Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 346-47, 411 P.2d 921, 935-36, 49 
Cal. Rptr. 825, 839-40 (1966). 
While no precise line between proper and improper conduct of an employee 
regarding preparation for future competition has been established .in Maryland, 
certain limits of proper and improper conduct have been recognized~ Instances of 
proper conduct include: (1) purchase of a rival business, C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer 
Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 366, 183 A.2d 374, 379 (1962); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 393, Comment e (1958); (2) immediate competition upon 
termination of employment, Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 
Md. 592, 602, 119 A.2d 392, 397 (1956); (3) advising customers of proposed 
termination of employment, Id. at 600, 119 A.2d at 396; and (4) making 
arrangements to compete after termination. Id. at 602, 119 A.2d at 397. 
Examples of improper conduct include: (1) appropriation of trade secrets, 
Space Aero Products Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 113-14,208 A.2d 74, 84, 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); (2) use of confidential information, C-E-I-R, Inc. 
v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 368, 183 A.2d 374, 380 (1962); (3) 
conspiracy to injure the employer's business, Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 
172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954); (4) solicitation of employer's customers prior to 
cessation of employment, Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 
241 Md. 550, 217 A.2d 375 (1966); C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 
Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962); (5) usurpation of employer's business opportunities, 
Standard Brands, Inc. v. United States Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. 
Supp. 161 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Comment, The Obligation of a High-Level Employee 
to his Former Employer: The Standard Brands Case, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 
(1962); and (6) solicitation of employer's key employees, C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer 
Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962). 
39. 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962). 
40. Id. at 365, 183 A.2d at 378-79. In C-E-I-R, unlike Maryland Metals, confidential 
information was used by the employees, and more importantly the employees 
breached a written employment agreement not to reveal such information. Id. at 
368, 183 A.2d at 380. 
41. Id. at 367-68, 183 A.2d at 379-80. 
42. See notes 3 & 9 supra. 
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duties of loyalty and fidelity.43 Maryland Metals claimed that 
Metzner and Sellers began preparations for the establishment of a 
competing business while still employed by Maryland Metals and 
that they failed to communicate their detailed activities to the 
corporation as required by law.44 When faced with such a contention, 
other courts have examined "the point of separation from the 
corporation in relation to the spectrum from fiduciary duties on the 
one end to active competition on the other."45 Similarly, courts will 
investigate the employee's behavior in relationship with the 
employer to determine whether it is reasonable and fair under the 
circumstances. 46 
The task of the court of appeals in Maryland Metals was to 
scrutinize the particular circumstances of the employees' 
preparatory arrangements to determine whether they were injurious 
and detrimental to the corporation. Unlike the employees in C-E-I-R, 
Metzner and Sellers did not misuse unique and confidential 
information regarding their employer's business. 47 Since 
information readily available to the public or individuals in the 
industry may be utilized by a former employee,48 the mere fact that 
Metzner and Sellers learned about the shredder's value and its 
availability while acting in a fiduciary capacity to the corporation 
did not preclude them from acquiring the shredder for themselves.49 
43. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Conservit, Inc., No. 29, 472 Equity, slip op. at 1 (Wash. 
Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1976), afl'd, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978); Brief for 
Appellant at 20, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 
(1978). 
44. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Conservit, Inc., No. 29, 472 Equity, slip op. at 1-2 
(Wash. Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1976), afl'd, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978); Brieffor 
Appellees at 13, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 
(1978). . 
45. Jacobs, Business Ethics and the Law: Obligations of a Corporate Executive, 28 
THE BUSINESS LAWYER 1063, 1076-77 (1973). 
46. See Comment, The Obligation of a High·Level Employee to His Former 
Employer: The Standard Brands Case, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 350 (1962). 
47. Although the trial court found that Metzner and Sellers did not appropriate 
confidential information from Maryland Metals, the corporation suggested in its 
brief that the employees engaged in innumerable meetings and had numerous 
items of correspondence, much of it on company time and at company expense, 
and were "feathering their nests" by setting up their business while drawing 
large salaries from the company. Brief for Appellant at 28, Maryland Metals, 
Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978). Metzner and Sellers, however, 
contended that all information acquired by them regarding the scrap processing 
business was readily available to the general public in trade and government 
publications. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Conservit, Inc., No. 29, 472 Equity, slip op. 
at 4 (Wash. Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1976), afl'd, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978); Brief 
for Appellees at 16, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 
(1978). 
48. See, e.g., National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polyner Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div. 732, 
737-38, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357, 362 (1948). 
49. See, e.g., Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 313-14, 49 P.2d 429, 
431 (1935). 
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The case is further distinguishable from C-E-I-R in that Metzner and 
Sellers's actions in acquiring land and purchasing a shredder did 
not deprive their former employer of any corporate opportunity. 50 
The corporation consistently rejected Metzner and Sellers's 
recommendations that Maryland Metals acquire a shredder. 51 The 
rejection of a corporate opportunity by a disinterested majority of the 
directors bars any challenge to subsequent exploitation of the 
situation by the fiduciary, 52 for "where the principal repudiates the 
transaction, the agent is free to act for himself."53 Nor did Metzner 
and Sellers appropriate trade secrets, 54 solicit customers, 55 or recruit 
50. Whether an employee has usurped a corporate opportunity depends upon which 
of the three tests the court uses in its deliberations: "expectancy," "line of 
business," or the "fairness" test. The "expectancy" test relies on whether the 
corporation realistically expects to seize and develop the opportunity. If the 
expectation is tangible, the corporate fiduciary may not appropriate it and 
thereby frustrate the corporate purpose. Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967); 
Abbott Redmont Thinlite Corp., v. Redmont, 324 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 475 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1973); Lagarde v. Anniston Lime 
& Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900); American Window Cleaning Co. v. 
Cohen, 343 Mass. 195, 178 N.E.2d 5 (1961); Lincoln Stores, Inc., v. Grant, 309 
Mass. 417,34 N.E.2d 704 (1941); Washer v. Seager, 272 App. Div. 297, 71 N.Y.S.2d 
46 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 918, 79 N.E.2d 745 (1948). See also Comment, The 
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 18 Sw. L. J. 96 (1964). 
The "line of business" test focuses on whether the opportunity the employee 
develops is materially related to an existing or prospective activity of the 
corporation. It is narrower than the "expectancy" test, and only requires a 
cursory examination of the context in which the opportunity arises. Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 222 
N.W.2d 71 (1974); Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REV. 765 (1961). 
The "fairness" test is an application of ethical principals to the situation. 
The court will look at all relevant facts and circumstances existing at the time 
the opportunity is appropriated. This test is least concerned with stated corporate 
purposes, emphasizing instead the concept of competitive fairness. Raines v. 
Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 313 S.W.2d 802 (1958); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.8.2d 667 
(Sup. Ct. 1940). See generally Comment, Liability of Directors and Other Officers 
for Usurpation of Corporate Opportunities, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 528 (1957). 
51. 282 Md. 31, 35, 382 A.2d 564, 566-67 (1978). 
52. Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REV. 765, 774 (1961). 
53. Note, Fiduciary Duty of Officers and Directors Not to Compete with the 
Corporation, 54 HARv L. REv. 1191, 1192 (1941) (footnote omitted). "If a 
corporation has actually determined not to engage in the line of business 
involved in the opportunity, [or has previously rejected the opportunity,] a 
director or officer may take advantage of its availability to him." W. KNEPPER, 
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 3.03, at 54 (2d ed. 1973) 
(footnote omitted). 
54. "A'trade secret consists of any valuable formula, pattern, device, process or other 
information that is used in one's business and gives the possessor a competitive 
advantage over those who do not know or use the information." Kubik, Inc. v. 
Hull, 56 Mich. App. 335, 347, 224 N.W.2d 80, 87 (1974). C{. Space Aero Products 
Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965) 
(court of appeals held plaintiffs "know how" in the manufacture of oxygen 
breathing hoses was a trade secret). 
55. Solicitation would clearly be a violation of fiduciary duty in Maryland. 
Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 119 A.2d 392 (1956). In 
Ritterpusch, the court of appeals upheld a lower·court's jury instruction which it 
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other key employees56 prior to terminating their employment. 
Rather, Metzner and Sellers displayed good faith and fidelity to 
Maryland Metals during the full term of their employment.57 The 
employees' recommendation to expand the business by buying a new 
shredder was designed to benefit the company. Indeed, even after 
submitting his resignation, Metzner negotiated a very profitable 
contract for the benefit of Maryland Metals.58 
After closely scrutinizing Metzner and Sellers's activities, the 
court was unable to find any breach of fiduciary duties. 59 In sum, the 
corporation failed to prove that the employees engaged in any 
conduct, beyond the mere failure to disclose details, which 
detrimentally affected Maryland Metals's business. so 
IV. EVOLUTION OF LAW: AN EMPLOYEE'S PRIVILEGE TO 
MAKE PLANS FOR COMPETITION BEFORE 
TERMINATING HIS EMPLOYMENT 
The result declared in Maryland Metals represents a stage in the 
gradual evolution away from traditional agency law, which severely 
curtailed an employee's independence, toward more practical rules in 
light of the realities of the modern employment relationship.61 
characterized as stating that an employee "may not go as far as to solicit the 
business or customers of his employer before the termination of his employ-
ment." Id. at 595, 119 A.2d at 393. 
56. See C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962); 
Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954). 
57. It is important to note that in March of 1974, only three months prior to his 
resignation, the Board of Directors passed a resolution awarding Metzner a 
bonus of $40,000.00 in recognition of his dedicated and skillful work. Brief for 
Appellees at 11, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 
(1978). See also note 21 and accompanying text supra. 
58.' 282 Md. 31, 44, 382 A.2d 564, 571 (1978). 
59. Id. at 48, 382 A.2d at 573. 
60. Id. Unlike the present case, a majority of past cases involving employment 
disputes have held in favor of the employer on grounds of the employee's abuse 
of his fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F.2d 236 (N.D. 
Cal. 1931) (operating competing company while president of plaintiff corpora-
tion); Hall v. Dekker, 45 Cal. App. 2d 783, 115 P.2d 15 (1941) (organizing 
competing business while secretary-treasurer of plaintiff); C·E-I-R, Inc., v. 
Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962); Ritterpusch v. 
Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 119 A.2d 392 (1956); Duane Jones Co. 
v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954). But see, e.g., Computer Sciences 
Corp. v. Ferguson, 74 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 1968) (court found employee's 
preparatory arrangements did not injure employer since employee did not solicit 
other employees or customers of his employer, nor disclose trade secrets or use 
confidential information). 
61. See Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate 
and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1 (1976). "[T]he rigid standard of undivided 
loyalty has given way to a more flexible norm, as courts have come to take a 
more pragmatic view of business practices." Id. at 51 (citing United Founders 
Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1971); 
Shlenshy v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960); 
Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643,256 N.Y.S.2d 607 
(1965». 
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The employee-employer relationship has been governed in the 
past by strict agency principles.62 Traditionally, an employee has 
been required to avoid placing himself in a position where his 
interests might conflict with those of his employer63 and has been 
held liable for the slightest deviation from his fiduciary duties.64 In 
every employment contract, whether written or oral, courts have 
found an implied obligation on the part of the employee to serve his 
employer diligently and faithfully,65 to perform the employment 
duties honestly,66 to use his best efforts for the benefit of the 
62. Historically, the conflicts between an employer and a former employee who hOas 
become a competitor can be traced back to the sixteenth century when 
employment was carried on chiefly through the guild system, in which the 
apprentice, following a long period of training, was free to practice his trade even 
in competition with the master who had instructed him. As apprentices' terms of 
service expired, masters tried to require that apprentices could not carry out their 
occupation as "freemen" without their master's consent. Thus, the Act for 
Avoiding of Exactions Taken Upon Apprentices was passed in 1536. 28 Hen. 8, 
ch. 5. That statute prohibited masters from compelling apprentices to take an 
oath not to set up or keep any shop nor receive money "for or concerning his or 
their freedom or occupation .... " Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 
73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 634 (1960). 
Long before the rise of the corporation as a dominant form of modem 
business, the law imposed upon the employee a duty of loyalty. 
The duty of loyalty, as applied to business activities engaged in by one 
in the position of employee, is the duty of so disciplining one's 
acquisitive impulses that they will operate vicariously so as to increase 
to the maximum extent possible not one's own acquisitions but those of 
one's employer. 
Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of The Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers 
Practicable? 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194, 195 (1935). 
63. E.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939) (corporate officer); De 
Crette v. Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 115, 127 A. 639, 642 (1925) (agent); Meinhard v. 
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-65, 164 N.E. 545, 546-47 (1928) (joint venturer). 
64. Disputes of this nature are heard in equity and the remedies may be any or all of 
the following. An injunction or restraining order may be issued when such 
judicial action may prevent employer injury. See, e.g., United Board & Carton 
Corp. v. Britting, 63 N.J. Super. 517, 164 A.2d 824 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 61 N.J. 
Super. 340, 160 A.2d 660, cert. denied, 33 N.J. 326, 164 A.2d 379 (1960) (court 
restrained salesmen who used employer's confidential price list from competing 
for two years). Damages may be awarded by the equity court's ancillary 
jurisdiction for subsequent injuries resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954) (plaintiff granted 
$300,000 damages for loss of clients caused by improper employee solicitation). 
An accounting may be ordered to compensate employer for losses suffered. Nagel 
v. Todd, 185 Md. 512, 45 A.2d 326 (1946) (agent negotiated lower purchase price 
and kept the difference). A court may impose a constructive trust with the 
corporation as the beneficiary of all earnings. Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 
F.2d 236 (N.D. Cal. 1931) (director of the plaintiff corporation required to submit 
to an accounting for profits earned by a competing cab company incorporated by 
the director while serving as plaintiff's director). 
65. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 38, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (1978). See 
also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939). 
66. See Stuber v. Taylor, 200 N.W.2d 276, 280 (N.D. 1972) (agent has duty to "deal 
fairly with the principal in all transactions between them."); cf. Maryland Credit 
v. Hagerty, 216 Md. 83, 90, 139 A.2d 230, 233 (1958) (employee has duty to refrain 
from deception). 
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employer,67 and to refrain from any acts injurious to his employer's 
interests.68 The common law maxim, "no man can serve two 
masters," has been articulated by numerous courtS.69 Moreover, 
many courts have recognized Justice Cardozo's classic statement in 
Meinhard v. Salmon:70 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for 
those acting at arm's length, (sic) are forbidden to those 
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something 
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most' sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has 
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. 
Uncompromising rigidity has been, the attitude of courts of 
equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided 
loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular 
exceptions. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct of 
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by 
the crowd. 71 
The first Maryland case to discuss an employee's privilege to 
plan to compete before terminating his employment was Ritterpusch 
v. Lithographic Plate Service, Inc. 72 The court stated in dicta that an 
employee has a legal right, while still employed, to make 
preparations to compete with his employer before terminating his 
employment.73 The employees in Ritterpusch, however, were held to 
be in violation of their fiduciary duties because their actions of 
soliciting employer's customers before terminating their employment 
went beyond the scope of the privilege.74 
C·E·I-R75 was the next Maryland case to acknowledge the 
employee's privilege. The court again ruled in favor of the employer's 
vested property interests and held that the employees' solicitation 
went beyond the scope of the privilege.76 Ambiguous overtones 
67. C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 366, 183 A.2d 374, 379 
(1962). . 
68. Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 600, 119 A.2d 392, 
395-96 (1956). 
69. E.g., Aero Drapery of Ky., Inc. v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1974); De 
Crette v. Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 115, 127 A. 639, 642 (1925). A borrowed employee, 
however, may become the servant of the transferee. Compare Charles v. Barrett, 
233 N.Y. 127, 135 N.E. 199 (1922) (so long as the employee is furthering his 
employer's business, there is no change of masters), with Gordon v. S.M. Byers 
Motor Car Co., 309 Pa. 453, 164 A. 334 (1932) (borrowed servant found to be 
promoting the interests of two masters). 
70. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). 
71. Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546. 
72. 208 Md. 592, 119 A.2d 392 (1956). 
73. Id. at 602, 119 A.2d at 397. 
74. Id. at 595, 119 A.2d at 393. 
75. 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962). 
76. Id. at 367, 183 A.2d at 379. 
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regarding disclosure were made by the court in an effort to safeguard 
proprietary interests of an employer against the employee's 
privilege. The court declared in seemingly contradictory dicta: 
We do not intimate that in all cases an employee must tell 
his employer of his future plans to become a competitor. 
However, the rule is well established that an agent is under 
a duty' to disclose to his employer any information 
concerning the agency which the employer would be likely to 
want to know. 77 
It was not until sixteen years later in Maryland Metals that the 
court clarified and refined the C-E-J-R dicta by declaring that to 
require disclosure of preparatory details would negate the employee's 
privilege.7R Maryland Metals is the first Maryland case to hold in 
favor of the employee's privilege when confronted with the dilemma 
of an employee competing against a former employer.79 Thus, the 
present state of the law in Maryland is that an employee's failure to 
disclose details of his preparation for competition is not a breach of 
fiduciary duties unless some other conduct, apart from nondisclo-
sure, is injurious to the employer's business.so 
An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions are in general accord 
'with Maryland's view that an employee has a legal privilege to 
co~mence preparatory activities for future competition against his 
employer, before terminating his employment.S! There has been 
77, Id. at 367, 183 A.2d at 379-80. 
78, 282 Md. 31, 47, 382 A.2d 564, 573 (1978). 
79. Maryland Metals is significant because it is' the first Maryland case in which 
employees prevailed in an employment dispute on the basis of their privilege to 
prepare to compete prior to ending their employment. In an earlier Maryland 
case, Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 217 
A.2d 375 (1966), employees prevailed in an employment dispute but not on the 
basis of their privilege. In Operations Research, former employees and a 
corporation organized by them after terminating their employment were sued by 
the former corporate employer for breach of duties. Operations Research, Inc. 
alleged that two employees breached their duties by wrongfully recruiting key 
employees, using confidential information in the nature of trade secrets and 
diverting corporate opportunities after they resigned. The court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the'bill of complaint on the basis that the 
corporation failed to prove that the employees breached their duties before 
resigning, Although the court acknowledged that an employee has a privilege 
before terminating employment to make arrangements to compete, the em· 
ployee's privilege was not the basis of the court's decision because the record 
failed to show any preparatory arrangements by the employees before leaving 
their employment. Id. at 572, 217 A.2d ~t 388. 
80. 282 Md. at 42 n.4, 382 A.2d at 570 n.4. 
81. See, e.g., Bancroft·Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 411 P.2d 921, 49 Cal. Rptr. 
825 (1966). The court, in Bancroft, focused on a corporate officer's conduct and 
found that he had breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to his employer by 
aiding a competitor in the solicitation of corporate employees. The court 
enunciated the principle that an employee is not required to disclose his 
preparatory arrangements in every situation but only when the preparations 
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disagreement, however, on the extent of disclosure required by an 
employee concerning his competitive plans while employed. Several 
courts have required full disclosure of preparatory activities,82 while 
others have declared that there is no requirement to disclose any 
plans or preparations.1l3 
In Maryland Metals, the court of appeals was bound by the 
lower court's finding of fact that the employees informed Maryland 
Metals of their general intention to compete.84 Therefore, the court 
neglected to address expressly the question of whether disclosure of 
a general intention to compete, as distinguished from disclosure of 
specific acts of preparation, is required by law. If the court were 
confronted with the issue in the near future, it would most likely 
favor the employee's privilege and declare that an employee need not 
disclose his intentions to compete. This conclusion is supported by 
dicta in Maryland Metals, in which the court indicated that even a 
complete failure to disclose an intention to compete would not have 
constituted a breach of the employees' fiduciary duty.85 Conse-
quently, the court of appeals seems to have joined, by way of dicta, 
the growing minority of jurisdictions that do not require an 
employee to disclose any intention to compete because such a 
requirement inhibits an employee's privilege to prepare. 
render nondisclosure harmful to the employer. Accord, Cudahy Co. v. American 
Laboratories, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Neb. 1970); Colon ell v. Goodman, 78 F. 
Supp. 845 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 169 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 
870 (1948); United Board & Carton Corp. v. Britting, 63 N.J. Super. 517,164 A.2d 
824 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 61 N.J. Super. 340,160 A.2d 660, cert. denied, 33 N.J. 
326, 164 A.2d 379 (1960). 
82. E.g., Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952); Standard 
Brands, Inc. v. United States Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161 
(E.D. Wis. 1961); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Pratt, 22 F. Supp. 304 (D. Kan. 1938); 
Societa Operaia Di Mutuo Soccorso Villalba v. Di Maria, 40 N.J. Super. 344, 122 
A.2d 897 (1956); Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 210 (1950); 
Faultersack v. Clintonville Sales Corp., 253 Wis. 432, 34 N.W.2d 682 (1948). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §393 Comment e (1958) supports an 
employee's right to prepare to compete with his employer before termination, but 
the RESTATEMENT does not state the employee's corollary right to make such 
preparations without the necessity of revealing such plans to his employer. Brief 
for Appellees at 19, Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 
(1978). 
83. See Metal Lubricants Co. v. Engineered Lubricants Co., 411 F.2d 426, 428-30 (8th 
Cir. 1969); Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp. 
1173, 1181-82 (D. Ariz. 1973); Thau·Nolde, Inc. v. Krause Dental Supply & Gold 
Co., 518 S.W.2d 5, 9-10 (Mo. 1974); National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 
S.W.2d 1, 26 (Mo. 1966). 
84. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
85. "[Maryland Metals] denies that [Metzner and Sellers] ever notified it of their 
intention to establish a competing enterprise ... As we see it, however, the 
giving of the contested notice in this case is not dispositive of the breach of 
fiduciary duty question." Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 42 n.4, 
382 A.2d 564, 570 n.4 (1978) (emphasis added). 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF MARYLAND METALS 
Maryland Metals represents a shift in the court's focus when 
deciding employment disputes. The court initially will consider the 
individual employee's right to work and privilege to prepare to 
compete, and then take into account the employer's interests to 
determine whether the employee's conduct has been injurious to the 
employer's business. Before Maryland Metals, the court first 
considered the employer's right to protect his business against 
ambitious employees, and then examined the employee's privilege. 
Thus, under the pre-Maryland Metals approach; courts generally 
favored an employer's property interests over an employee's 
privilege to prepare for a change of employment.86 The court's shift 
in focus after Maryland Metals will likely result, however, in more 
decisions favoring employees when a court is confronted with 
employment disputes similar to the one in Maryland Metals. H7 
Employers should not interpret Maryland Metals as an unwill-
ingness by the court to protect an employer's legitimate proprietary 
interests,88 but should recognize it as a signal "employers beware"89 
of competitive employees. While the court of appeals indicated that a 
covenant not to compete might have avoided the entire problem for 
the corporation,90 it is not at all clear whether a post-employment 
86. See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 299 A.2d 835 (1973); C·E·I·R, Inc. v. Computer 
Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 257, 183 A.2d 374 (1962); Maryland Credit Fin. Corp. v. 
Hagerty, 216 Md. 83, 139 A.2d 230 (1958); Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., 
Inc., 208 Md. 592, 119 A.2d 392 (1956); De Crette v. Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 127 A. 
639 (1925); Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598 (1875). But see 
Operations Research, Inc. v. Davidson & Talbird, Inc., 241 Md. 550, 217 A.2d 375 
(1966); note 82 supra. 
87. A trend favoring employees in employment disputes can be discerned by 
examining cases in jurisdictions other than Maryland. In California, courts have 
decided in favor of employees on various occasions. E.g., Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 
260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 255,67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 26 (1968) (employer failed to show any 
evidence that the employees misappropriated trade secrets or used unfair tactics 
in soliciting the corporation's employees and court deemed employee's interests 
to be superior to corporation's interests). Knudsen Corp. v. Ever·Fresh Foods, 
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 241, 245 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The court in Knudsen denied an 
employer's application for preliminary injunction against ex-employees because 
there was no showing of illegal conduct by them. The court observed that in the 
absence of wrongful behavior, an employee's right to seek better employment 
prevails over the business interests of his employer. Computer Sciences Corp. v. 
Ferguson, 74 Cal. Rptr. 86,93 (Ct. App. 1968) (court ruled in favor of employee 
since his preparatory conduct resulted in no loss or detriment to his employer). 
88. Property rights that the employer may protect include trade secrets, confidential 
information, corporate opportunities, and contractual relations with others. See, 
e.g., Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 234 Ind. 398, 410-11,127 N.E.2d 235, 240 
(1955); Newman, Formation of Competing Enterprise by Corporate Fiduciary, 3 
Hous. L. REV. 221, 230-31 (1965). 
89. Caveat patronus. D. P. SIMPSON, CASSELL'S NEW LATIN DICTIONARY, 96, 427 
(1960). 
90. 282 Md. 31, 48, 382 A.2d 564, 574 (1978). 
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noncompetition covenant91 would have changed the result in 
Maryland Metals. 92 
Neither should Maryland Metals be misinterpreted by employees 
who seek to compete with their employers. Maryland Metals does not 
recognize an unfettered right in favor of an employee to commence 
preparatory activities while employed.93 The court declared that an 
employee need not disclose preparatory activities provided there is 
not some other conduct on the part of the employee that is injurious 
to the employer's business. Additionally, the well-established 
categories of improper employee conduct resulting in a breach of 
fiduciary duty were implicitly affirmed by the court in Maryland 
Metals. 94 
91. Post-employment, noncompetition covenants should be distinguished from other 
types of covenants not to compete, such as covenants incidental to the sale of a 
business. See Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 
244, 256 (1928). The purpose of a post-employment restraint is to prevent 
competitive use of information or relationships which pertain peculiarly to the 
employer and which the employee acquired during the course of his employment, 
whereas the objective of a covenant not to compete ancillary to the sale of a 
business is to restrain the seller from recapturing and utilizing the good will of 
the business which was transferred. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to 
Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 647 (1960). Courts generally have displayed a 
stricter attitude toward post-employment covenants than restrictive covenants 
incidental to the sale of a business due to "powerful considerations of public 
policy which militate against s~ctioning the loss of a man's liveihood." See, 
e.g., Purchasing Associates, Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 271, 196 N.E.2d 245, 247 
(1963). Thus, post-employment covenants, which an employee agrees to as a 
condition of employment, are subject not only to the reasonableness test 
applicable to other types of covenants not to compete, but are enforceable only to 
the extent necessary to protect the employer against the use of trade secrets, 
customer lists, and similar confidential information that the employee has 
obtained as a result of his employment. [d. See generally Kreider, Trends in the 
Enforcement of Restrictive Employment Contracts, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 16 (1966). 
92. While the topic of post-employment, noncom petition covenants is beyond the 
scope of this casenote, certain generalizations regarding judicial analysis of 
restrictive covenants can be noted as they are well-established. First, the scope of 
e·ach covenant will be analyzed on a case by case basis. E.g., Becker v. Bailey 
268 Md. 93, 299 A2d 835 (1973). Second, a covenant must be reasonable as to 
duration, area and scope of activities. E.g., Ruhl v. F.A Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 
245 Md. 118, 225 A2d 288 (1967); see also Annot., 41 AL.R.2d 15(1955) (duration 
of restriction); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94 (1955) (geographical restriction). Third, 
reasonableness of the covenant requires that the restraint be no greater than 
necessary to protect an employer's interests, the covenant is not unduly harsh 
and oppressive on the employee, and th!it the covenant is not injurious to the 
public. E.g., Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 
N.E.2d 685, 691-692 (Ct. C.P., Cuyahoga City 1952); see also Note, Validity p.nd 
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants Not to Compete, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 161, 
169 (1964). 
The existence of a post-employment noncompetition covenant in Maryland 
Metals might have been struck down by the court as an unreasonable restraint 
on the employees' employment freedom and economic mobility. 
93. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra. 
94 282 Md. 31, 40-41, 382 A2d 564, 569-70 (1978). See note 38 supra. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In reaching its decision in Maryland Metals, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has extended the swing of the legal pendulum, 
which recently has favored individual rights over business rights, 
into the field of employment disputes. The law has taken a dramatic 
shift in favor of individuals in areas such as landlord-tenant law,95 
contract disputes,96 strict and products liability,97 and now employ-
95. For an excellent discussion of the shift in focus in the landlord-tenant 
relationship away from feudal property concepts to the modern apartment lease 
relationship and the public policy reasons for the shift, see Javins v. First Nat'l 
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See also 
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 8-211 (Supp. 1978). Maryland has not yet 
recognized an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases, but § 8-211 
which deals with a landlord's duty to provide habitable premises, includes a rent 
escrow provision. If "the landlord has failed to cure defects after notice and 
opportunity to cure, the tenant may bring a rent escrow action" under the 
statute. Davison, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and Its 
Potential Effects Upon Maryland Landlord-Tenant Law, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 247, 
257 (1976). 
96. The emerging law on unconscionable contracts has been applied in numerous 
contractual transactions cases. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (monthly installment payments on a rotating credit 
system); Abbott v. Abbott, 188 Neb. 61, 195 N.W.2d 204 (1972) (settlement of a 
will contest); American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 
A.2d 886 (1964) (home improvement contracts); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing 
Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972) (apartment lease). 
Section 2-302 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE provision on 
unconscionability reads as follows: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of 
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the 
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder 
of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or 
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, 
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination. 
Maryland adopted the above U.C.C. provision verbatim in ch. 538, 1963 Md. 
Laws 802. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §2-302 (1975). For an interesting extension of 
the concept into the law on damages, see McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. 
App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975) (tire "warranty" limiting damages to replacement 
of tire only held unconscionable). 
97. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), noted in, 6 
U. BALT. L. REV. 295 (1977). The Court of Appeals of Maryland joined the vast 
majority of jurisdictions and adopted a standard of products liability in tort 
stated in Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). The court 
stated that one justification for imposing a strict liability on manufacturers for 
defective products is "because it shifts the risk of loss to those better able 
financially to bear the loss." 278 Md. at 343, 363 A.2d at 958. See generally 
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288,336 A.2d 118 (1975); Giant Food, 
Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Moran 
v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. 
Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). See also Digges, Product Liability in 
Maryland Revisited, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (1977); Product Liability Law 
Symposium, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 1-151 (1975). 
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ment disputes.98 Maryland Metals indicates that an employee's 
interest in his own economic welfare will be deemed superior to his 
employer's business interests absent a showing that the employee 
has committed an injurious act accompanying his change to new 
employment.99 
Charles P. Bauer 
J. Michael Dougherty, Jr. 
98. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564 (1978). 
99. Id. Accord, Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1968). 
In Franzen the California Court of Appeal observed that: 
[The courts should not be concerned] solely with the interests of the 
competing employers, but also with the employee's interests. The 
interests of the employee in his own mobility and betterment are deemed 
paramount to the competitive business interests of the employers, where 
neither the employee nor his new employer has committed any illegal act 
accompanying the employment change. 
Id. at 255, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 26. 
